STALIN VS. TROTSKY
I. Dzhugashvili and Bronstein
Joseph Stalin, born Dzhugashvili, and Leon
Trotsky, born Bronstein, were the same age, and both had been from early
youth members of the Russian Social Democratic party. As dedicated
Communists, they had common basic outlook: they were philosophical
materialists, committed to the unity of theory and practice and bent
upon spreading Communism throughout the whole world. While Lenin was
alive (at any rate until 1922) both men had a secure place in his favor
and therefore in the party as a whole. Since 1917, at least, Trotsky had
supported Lenin on the main issues and seemed to have more of his candor
and flexibility than Stalin. However, as Lenin sickened and died, the
mutual antagonism between Trotsky and Stalin, who had never been
compatible, deepened into a life-and-death struggle.
A. Stalin
It is difficult to compare the later lives of
the two men, for Stalin achieved sole power and Trotsky was exiled.
Since Trotsky thus escaped Stalin's dilemmas, it is uncertain how he
would have responded to them, although he detested Stalin's rule. Stalin
hated his adversary so deeply that he caused his name to be written
simply "Judas Trotsky" in officially commissioned books, but
he borrowed many of his ideas and methods. Their earlier lives, however,
suggest something of the personal differences which were to be
complicated by disagreements over doctrine and practice.
Stalin was the eldest surviving child of the
shoemaker Vissarion Dzhugashvili of Gori in Georgia. Today the hut in
which he was born is preserved by a temple-like structure erected over
it. As a boy he attended a church school in Gori and then the
theological seminary in Tiflis. Today the seminary has been converted
into a museum of medieval Georgian art. Young Joseph joined a Marxist
society known as Mesame-Dasi while a student at the seminary, but it is
not clear whether this had anything to do with his expulsion in 1899.
During the next two years his Marxism crystallized, and his first
Marxist essays appeared in a Georgian newspaper in 1901. At that time he
was already an enthusiastic defender of Lenin and the other orthodox
Marxist exiles who published the newspaper Iskra. His literary style was
not then distinguished; in fact, it never got much better.
Stalin was active in the revolutionary movement
in Tiflis, Batum, and elsewhere, not as Dzhugashvili, nor yet
"Stalin," but as "Koba." This meant something like
"courageous" in Turkish, and it was also the name of a labeled
Georgian freebooter. It is uncertain which the nickname first signified.
Later he was called, indeed, practically dubbed himself, the "Lenin
of the Cauccasus." However, he was not necessarily the most
outstanding leader of the Caucasian Social Democrats, nor even of the
Georgian Bolsheviks after the party split in 1903. The great majority of
the Marxists in Georgia became and stayed Menshevik. Among the
Bolsheviks Stalin was prominent, but that did not mean a great deal.
Very soon after the news of the London Congress of 1903 reached the
Caucasus, he took a firmly pro-Bolshevik stand, and he continued to do
so in 1905. it seems that it was at the Tammerfors Party conference at
the end of 1905, that Stalin first met Lenin.
After the Revolution of 1905, in defiance of the
ban of the then Menshevik-controlled Party, "Koba" led
"fighting squads" in raiding banks in order to augment scant
Party funds. In one raid in Tifiis a squad seized ad quarter of a
million rubles. This is the basis of the legend that Stalin was a bank
robber. But he did not act as gunman, and he did not pocket the
proceeds. He spent much of the period between revolutions in jail or in
exile, but made a few important trips abroad in 1912.
By this time the Bolshevik organizations in
Russia had been gravely weakened, and the Bolsheviks of the Caucasus had
assumed an importance quite out of proportion to their numbers. Stalin
had became editor of the Party newspaper, Pravda, and he was co-opted by
Lenin onto the Party Central Committee just after the Prague conference
of 1912, at which the Bolsheviks broke permanently with the other
Marxist factions. He visited Lenin in exile and spent some time with
him. As a result of their talks, he wrote an essay on the
"nationalities question" which led Lenin to inform Gorky that
a "wonderful Georgian" had done a fine job on the subject. The
pseudonym with which the pamphlet was signed was "K. Stalin."
At the outbreak of World War I Stalin was in
Siberian exile, sharing a hut with Sverdlov, future Chairman of the
Presidium (president} of the Soviet republic, who, it seems, found
Stalin an uncomradely hut partner. Stalin chose not to try to escape
during the war. In 1916 he was summoned to Krasnoiarsk to be drafted but
was found physically unfit for military service owing to his withered
left arm. During the war period he apparently wrote next to nothing.
Liberated by the February Revolution, Stalin
hastened to Petrograd and, as the only member of the Central Committee
on the spot, assumed temporary leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Like
almost all other Bolsheviks, he became identified with the movement for
reunification with the Mensheviks. When Lenin arrived and sharply
castigated such tendencies to compromise, Stalin was as dumfounded as
anyone else, but he took his scolding without protest. He owed his
position in the Party to the fact that he worked hard and did not argue
with his comrades, especially Lenin.
B. Trotsky
Trotsky, like Stalin, was born in 1879. His real
name was Lev Davidovich Bronstein. His father was a well-to-do Jewish
farmer in the Ukrainian province of Kherson. He attended school in
Odessa, developing an early brilliance and bookishness. He reports his
observation of the composition of his class: "the tale-bearers and
envious at one pole, the frank, courageous boys at the other, and the
neutral, vacillating mass in the middle." He was to apply the same
threefold classification to his fellow revolutionaries and fellow
citizens of the Empire and the world. In his teens he went to Nikolaev,
met a number of populists, became enamored of a girl in the group, and
accepted the populist doctrine. Soon, however, he became converted to
Marxism, engaged in revolutionary activity, and for it spent his
eighteenth birthday in jail. He was exiled to Siberia but soon escaped
and arrived in London in 1902 to join Lenin. In Western Europe he met
another young lady. The girl from Nikolaev was known as Mrs. Bronstein,
the Parisian as Mrs. Trotsky, and neither seemed to complain.
After the II Congress in 1903 Trotsky
was for a time associated with the Mensheviks, but in 1905 he developed
an independent doctrinal line and between revolutions belonged to
neither the Bolshevik nor the Menshevik wing. In 1905 he won renown for
his brief chairmanship of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers'
Deputies. During the next few years he tried to reunite the Party and
for that reason refrained form trying to build a faction of his own.
None of the other groups found this pose to its taste. During the years
just before World War I Trotsky's anti-factionalist stand became in
effect an anti-Leninist one. After the war began he went to New York,
and it was from there that he traveled to Russia in the spring of 1917.
During the summer he joined the Bolshevik Party, although he clearly
implied that his only reason for doing so was that the party had
belatedly adopted the analysis and tactical line which he had espoused
all along.
His ability and his logic did not
always endear him to his comrades, but his oratorical and practical
gifts did win him broad popularity among the urban workers and soldiers
in late 1917 and during the Civil War. having failed as foreign
commissar to put into effect his dialectical but quixotic policy of
"no war, no peace," he had become war commissar, and his most
brilliant success was achieved in organizing the finally victorious Red
Army. As war commissar he clashed with Stalin, who ensconced himself at
Tsaritsyn with some of his old friends from Caucasus days and flouted
Trotsky's authority. However, Stalin was as yet no adversary in the
field of theory and policy, which Trotsky considered fundamental.
As the triumvirate took form, Trotsky was plainly the
most important figure outside it. But no one regarded Stalin as the most
eminent of the three. Zinoviev, especially, had an international
prestige which Stalin lacked, while both Kamenev and he were regarded as
theorists in a way Stalin was not--and a Communist leader had to be a
theorist. As the struggle developed between Trotsky and the triumvirs,
Stalin counted less on his own influence than on Trotsky's
vulnerability. He did not at first try to turn the struggle into a
personal contest. An eye witness has told the story of how Zinoviev and
Kamenev would snub Trotsky in Politburo meetings, while Stalin would
greet him warmly
II. Trotsky Against the Triumvirate
On the eve of Lenin's death, the
Thirteenth Party Conference published, on Stalin's motion, the decision
empowering the Central Committee to expel Party members for
factionalism. At the moment the leader died a new sanctity enveloped his
every word and deed, including this decision, in which Lenin had taken
part. Simultaneously the triumvirs decreed a new recruiting campaign,
nominally with a view to strengthening the actual worker element in
Party ranks. Actually Stalin, as general secretary, was able to bolster
his own influence by guiding the Party machinery in selecting new
members. In a few short weeks nearly a quarter of a million men and
women were admitted in the new "Lenin enrollment." At
the time of the XIII Party Congress in May 1924, the economic situation
was improving sufficiently to enable the triumvirs to call their critics
to account. Zinoviev openly attacked Trotsky and demanded that he
retract his "errors." As Stalin had only shortly before
opposed Zinoviev's demand for Trotsky's arrest, he found it wise to
remain in the background. Trotsky replied to Zinoviev with a cri de
coeur which went to the root of his whole position, morally requiring
him to sit passive in the face of doom:
The party in the last analysis is always
right because the party is the single historic instrument given to the
proletariat for the solution of its fundamental problems. I have
already said that in front of one's own party nothing could be easier
than to say: all my criticisms, my statements, my warnings, my
protests--the whole thing was a mere mistake. I, however, comrades,
cannot say that, because I do not think it. I know that one must not
be right against the party. One can be right only with the party, and
through the party, for history has created no other road for the
realization of what is right.
The Congress was unmoved. It promptly
took steps to discipline the Russian Troskyites, as well as dissidents
in the other parties of the Comintern.
A. "Permanent Revolution"
After the XIII Congress, as far as
could be seen the chief antagonists were Trotsky on the one hand and
Zinoviev and Kamenev on the other. In the autumn of 1924 Trotsky
published The Lessons of October, in which he distinguished between
objectively revolutionary situations and subjective failures of
revolutionary leaders in such situations. As illustrations oft he
latter, he cited Zinoviev's and Kamenev's opposition to Lenin's decision
to launch an armed uprising in the fall of 1917--thus reopening an
extremely ugly wound--and he also implied that Zinoviev was largely
responsible for the failure of the German Communist revolt of 1923.
Trotsky restated his old theory of
"permanent revolution," with its emphasis on the world
leadership of the proletariat and its implicit challenge to the Leninist
position on the role of the poor peasantry in building socialism.
"October," said Trotsky, was the crucial stage in the history
of the Party. "October" meant to him the time when Lenin
adopted Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution--at least in the sense
of rapid passage from the bourgeois to the socialist stage.
Trotsky had made a tactical error. By
his emphasis on "October" he opened the way for Zinoviev and
Kamenev to retaliate by reminding the Party again of Trotsky's sharp
disagreements with Lenin prior to 1917. Stalin's caution had reaped its
reward. Since he was not directly drawn into this controversy, he was in
a position to make public statements in November which in effect forgave
Zinoviev and Kamenev for their earlier mistakes--he even acknowledged
some of his own--but forcefully recalled to his hearers the fact that
Trotsky was, after all, a newcomer in Party ranks.
B. "Socialism in one
country"
Meanwhile Stalin unleashed a new
weapon, which Trotsky probably had not considered him capable of
producing. He set forth a theoretical position of his own from which he
could challenge Trotsky. in order to do so he had to reverse himself
within the space of a few months. In Foundations of Leninism~ published
early in 1924, he had denied that a proletarian dictatorship could
establish socialism before the victory of the world revolution. A few
months later, in Problems of Leninism, he advanced his theory of
"Socialism in one country."
The theory was an innovation and a
repudiation of some things which Lenin had said years earlier; but it
was a perfectly logical extension of what Lenin had said and done in
1917 and later. If the Russian Communists were not to be indefinitely
bogged down in the NEP state, they must push on to socialism, even if
the world revolution was still further delayed. Authority for such an
effort could be found in Lenin. Like Lenin, Trotsky believed the
building of socialism could begin in Russia alone. But what Stalin did
was to assert that it could be completed with success and to furnish
reasons for his contention. Russia was an enormous country, rich in
natural resources. Provided that "capitalist" intervention was
not renewed, the Russian proletariat, drawing on Russia's great
potential wealth and protected by its vast spaces, could accomplish the
task.
For a time, however, the theory of
"socialism in one country" was overshadowed by the acrimonious
personal struggle between Trotsky and the two most prominent triumvirs.
In January 1925 the Central Committee removed Trotsky from the War
Commissariat, even though he remained in uneasy possession of a seat on
the Politburo. This was the decisive blow. Although he was still not
completely crushed, Trotsky receded to the background. If he had been
another kind of man, he might have tried to use the Red Army against his
adversaries, but his loyalty to the Party was paramount, and he accepted
his deposition without trying to resist.
Although Trotsky was defeated, Zinoviev
and Kamenev soon discovered that the victory was not theirs. In March
1925 the Fourteenth Conference of the Party accepted Stalin's theory of
"socialism in one country," while Zinoviev and Kamenev paid
little attention. Soon afterward Stalin was able to break up the
triumvirate quietly. Too late Zinoviev and Kamenev attacked Stalin's new
theory. By the middle of 1925 he had found new allies in Bukharin, Rykov,
and Tomsky, who accepted "socialism in one country." Far from
yet aspiring openly to individual power, Stalin chose to be regarded as
a mediator, and he asserted that "after Ilich [Lenin]"
collegial--or what would later be called
"collective"--leadership was the only conceivable way of
running the party.
III. Stalin allied with the Right
Rykov had become Lenin's successor as
chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Tomsky was the leader of
the Soviet trade-unions. Bukharin, the "Left" Communist of
1918, was now, like Rykov and Tomsky, on the "right" and the
leader of those who felt that the NEP was a success, and while indeed
socialism might be built in Russia, the ground was secure and there was
no great need for haste. Zinoviev and Kamenev, on the contrary, were
profoundly uneasy about the continuation of the NEP, but they had been
abruptly thrust into the minority. In the autumn of 1925 Zinoviev
published his Leninism, attacking NEP as a policy of "continuous
retreat," and demanded a renewal of the "policy of 1918"
directed against the kulak. Zinoviev managed to use his position in
Leningrad to rally the powerful Party organization there to is support,
in opposition to the new Politburo majority.
Zinoviev and Kamenev tardily recognized
Stalin as the man from whom they had most to fear and carefully prepared
an attack on him for the XIV Party Congress, to be held in December
1925. However, the plan completely miscarried. Kamenev, who spoke most
sharply in criticism of Stalin at the Congress, was punished by demotion
from full member to candidate member of the Politburo. As reconstituted
just after the Congress, the Politburo had three new full members:
Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kalinin, all loyal henchmen of Stalin's. Stalin
also added several supporters to the list of candidate members of the
Politburo and to the newly enlarged Central Committee.
Shortly before, Voroshilov had replaced
Michael Frunze, who had been named Trotsky's successor but had died soon
afterward, as war commissar. Stalin had established a formidable
position of strength within both Party and government. Leningrad
remained the only stronghold of resistance, and Stalin followed up his
victory at the XIV Congress by sending Sergei Kirov to replace Zinoviev
as Party leader there, ordering him to clean out the opposition.
Only then, in the spring of 1926, when
the supporters of all three had been scattered, did Zinoviev and Kamenev
make common cause with Trotsky. Stalin's reaction was, "Ah, they
have granted themselves a mutual amnesty"--since a few short months
earlier they had been bitterly attacking each other. The three were
united enough in their opposition to continuance of the NEP and the
"alliance with the middle peasantry" on which it was based;
but their past personal antagonisms made their alliance an uneasy and
incongruous one.
In the meantime the Right wing oft he
Politburo was championing the NEP and all that it implied. Bukharin
advised the peasants, "Enrich yourselves,' which was a phrase
Guizot had used under the French monarchy of Louis Philippe, whatever
Marxist glosses might be given it. At the XIV Congress Bukharin had set
forth the basis on which he accepted Stalin's theory of "socialism
in one country": "We shall creep at a snail's pace, but...we
are building socialism and ... we shall complete the building of
it." This amounted to a frame of mind to which the NEP idea was
congenial, rather than something uneasily and temporarily accepted for
tactical reasons.
For the time being, however, Stalin was
less concerned about policy than with getting rid of his enemies in the
Left Opposition led by Zinoviev and Trotsky, which was not hard for him
to do. In July 1926 Lashevich, a Zinovievite who was Voroshilov's deputy
war commissar, was accused for organizing oppositionist groups within
the Red Army and was dismissed. Stalin seized the opportunity to expel
Zinoviev from the Politburo. On October 4 all the major opposition
leaders replied with a statement admitting violation of Party statutes
and pledging disbandment of the opposition, but they could not refrain
from repeating their policy criticisms of the Politburo majority.
Stalin's reply was to remove Trotsky
from the Politburo and Zinoviev from the presidency of the Comintern.
However, lesser figures in the opposition leadership were allowed to
recant and to obtain well-publicized rewards fro their submission. At
the end of October 1926 the Fifteenth Party Conference sanctioned all
these maneuvers and applauded Stalin's description of the opposition
leaders as "Social Democratic" deviators who were reverting to
the line of the Second International.
By the beginning of 1927 the Left
Opposition had thus lost any immediate hope of success, but its leaders
were not yet silenced. Trotsky and his colleagues attacked the Politburo
for "Thermidorism, degeneration, Menshevism, betrayal, treachery,
kulak-nepman policy against the workers, against the poor peasants,
against the Chinese revolution," as the Stalinist writer Popov sums
it up. The opposition leaders were able to blame the Politburo majority
for a series of foreign setbacks: Britain's rupture of diplomatic
relations with the USSR, the assassination of the Soviet ambassador in
Warsaw, and especially the crushing of the Chinese Communists by
Chiang-Kai-shek.
In an article submitted to Pravda,
Trotsky climaxed opposition criticism by calling on his adherents to
follow the example of Clemenceau (who had opened the way to take over as
French premier by attacking his predecessor's failures in World War I)
in case war engulfed the USSR (a prospect taken seriously by the
Communists in 1927). However, advocating a change of government was
dangerous in the Soviet Union. If, as all good Communists agreed, the
existing regime represented the proletariat, then any move to change it
was bound to be anti-proletarian and therefore treasonable. For that
reason Stalin promptly engineered the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev
from the Central Committee. After the two men led street demonstrations
on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution (November 7, 1927),
they were expelled from the Party.
The way was now clear for Stalin to
oust the opposition from the Party en masse. The XV Congress, in
December 1927, decreed as much. It might have been expected that
Stalin's tactics would have drawn his opponents together, but on the
contrary, the result was that they were neatly split down the middle.
Trotsky refused to accept the Congress decision and was thereupon exiled
to Alma Ata in Central Asia. But Zinoviev and Kamenev submitted and
renounced their earlier-stated views. They were permitted to crawl back
into the Party.
IV. Trotsky Defeated
As far as the Soviet Communist Party
and the Comintern were concerned, the controversy between Stalin and
Trotsky was now at an end. The followers of Trotsky left what they
henceforth called "Stalinist" ranks and attempted to build
their own parties and organize them into a Fourth International. The
dispute shook and divided the Communist parties throughout the world as
no such controversy before or since ever did (the immediately ensuing
struggle between Stalin and Bukharin had fewer repercussions abroad, for
it seemed to center on the peasant, for whom most Communists never had
any use).
By 1927, however, Trotsky and his
sympathizers had given up any immediate hope of overcoming Stalin's
ascendancy from within the Russian Party. They declared that a
"bureaucracy" had come to power in the USSR, and that it must
be eliminated. This assertion was difficult to explain on Marxist
grounds, unless it were to be on the basis of Marx's analysis of
Oriental society, and the Trotskyites shrank from that. Since Trotsky
continued to believe that a distorted socialism still existed in the
USSR, it was also difficult to think of any way through which the
Stalinist leadership could be displaced without disturbing the economic
foundation. As a result the Trotskyites had to retreat into a position
comparable to that of the prewar Social Democrats, opposing all existing
governments and declaring that there could be no basic improvement
unless they took power. They never managed to do so anywhere.
The rank and file of the world's
Communists had little chance to observe the personal differences and
antagonisms between Stalin and Trotsky, and supported one or the other
on the basis of his theoretical position. The differences may be briefly
formulated thus: Trotsky declared that it was impossible to build
socialism in Russia because the peasants did not want it. That it would
only be possible to do so if the workers of the West revolted, and he
was right. Stalin declared that it was impossible to wait for the
Western workers to revolt before building socialism, because they were
not likely to revolt in the immediate future. Therefore socialism could
be built in Russia only if the Party used the peasantry, and he was also
right.
However, that the Western workers were
not Communist, Trotsky could never admit. He could only assert that they
would be soon. The Russian peasants were not Communist, Stalin could
never admit, but he could try to compel them to be. As a result Trotsky
retreated into utopianism, while Stalin proceeded to establish a
minority dictatorship built on terror.
Send comments and questions to Professor
Gerhard Rempel, Western New England College.
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